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ARTICLE* 
CRISIS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Michael J. Gerhardt** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
No one loves a good crisis more than a constitutional law 
professor. We live for crises. We make our living writing and 
talking about them. And, in recent years, there has been a lot 
for us to write and talk about. In the past few decades, we have 
experienced such astonishing events as three serious 
impeachment attempts against presidents, several undeclared 
wars, including the current war at home and abroad against 
terrorism; a major, post-election dispute between the major 
presidential candidates, including the first time the Supreme 
Court resolved a judicial contest over a presidential election and 
arguably picked the winner; and several of the closest, most 
contentious Supreme Court confirmation hearings ever. Indeed, 
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School of Law on February 28, 2002, as the inaugural Judge James R. Browning 
Distinguished Lecturer in Law. 
**Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful for 
constructive feedback I received from Tom Baker, Bill Van Alstyne, and the participants 
in a faculty workshop at William & Mary Law School, for the extraordinary honor of 
serving as the first Judge James R. Browning Distinguished Lecturer in Law, and for the 
wonderful hospitality I received during my visit to the University of Montana Law 
School as the first Browning Lecturer. 
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if you wanted to find another generation that has faced anything 
like the domestic challenges that have confronted us in recent 
years, you would have to go all the way back to the Civil War. 
We have come to know each of these events as either 
constituting or barely avoiding a crisis in constitutional law.1 
1. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 604 
n.74 (1983) (noting that "If, for example, President Nixon had refused to give the 
'Watergate' tapes to the Special Prosecutor after the Supreme Court ordered him to do so 
in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), a constitutional crisis could well have 
resulted."); Candace H: Beckett, Separation of Powers and Federalism: Their Impact on 
Individual Liberty and the Functioning of Our Government, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 635, 
644 (1988) ("During the most serious constitutional crisis of recent decades, even 
countries with democratic heritages, such as those of Western Europe, could not 
understand American concerns with the Nixon Administration's transgressions of power. 
But Americans were alarmed, and the checks and balances locomotive went into high 
gear. Congress investigated the activities, the courts interpreted the law, and the press, 
protected by the first amendment, reported the developments that resulted in the 
downfall of an administration."); Alfredo Garcia, "No Fetish" for Privacy, Fairness, or 
Justice: Why William Rehnquist, Not Ken Starr, Was Responsible for William Jefferson 
Clinton's Impeachment, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL 'y 511, 513, (2001) ("My aim is to 
place the 'affair,' and the constitutional crisis it engendered, in a broader perspective. In 
short, the Starr investigation illustrated the Rehnquist Court's extreme deference to law 
enforcement objectives, to the detriment of the liberty interests of American citizens and 
the legitimacy of its own jurisprudence;" id. at 575. "At the outset of this endeavor, I 
sought to give a broader explanation for the constitutional crisis that embroiled the 
nation as a result of an illicit affair between the President and a young, impressionable 
intern, and the President's attempt to deny it;" id. at 580. "The Clinton constitutional 
crisis emerged not from a "politically naive" Supreme Court; it was born of ignorance of 
the ramifications of criminal constitutional jurisprudence in the most "real" of worlds."); 
Timothy Zick, The Consent of the Governed: Recall of United States Senators, 103 DICK. 
L. REV. 567, 610 (1999) ("If the country learned anything from the constitutional crisis 
brought about by the impeachment proceedings involving President Clinton, it was that 
the people can indeed put aside self-interest and partisanship for the common good. In 
other words, they proved themselves capable of choosing whom they please to govern 
them. The Framers' two-thirds vote requirement may have been the safeguard that 
ultimately prevented the president's impeachment, but the peoples' voices were also 
heard throughout the process that led to President Clinton's acquittal."); Mark Tushnet, 
The Supreme Court 1998 Term Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the 
Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARv. L. REV. 29, 60-61 (1999) (footnotes 
omitted) (maintaining that the Clinton impeachment was not a constitutional crisis) 
("[A]s President Clinton's impeachment and its outcome have demonstrated, 
impeachment need not be anything major. The impeachment of President Clinton seems 
to have had little effect qua impeachment. Within six months of President Clinton's 
acquittal, a leading Republican was quoted as observing, 'We have a president rolling the 
Congress, getting everything he wants.' Rather than as a constitutional crisis, we might 
see the impeachment as a 'no harm, no foul' event: anticipating an acquittal, a highly 
partisan and polarized House of Representatives satisfied its majority's partisan 
interests by voting for impeachment, without destabilizing the constitutional order. 
Similarly, future presidents might conclude that there is no serious risk in practicing the 
politics of preemption: impeachment might occur, but without serious consequences."); 
Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton Was No Andrew Johnson: Comparing Two 
Impeachments, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 422, 459 (2000) ("The Clinton impeachment was so 
unsatisfYing in part because it seemed so constitutionally unimportant. The heaviest 
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artillery in the constitutional arsenal was called out to address a scandal of the meanest 
character. Despite a numbing amount of commentary on the scandal, there was 
surprisingly little effort to explain the constitutional value of an impeachment. 
Republicans seemed to assume that Clinton had defaulted on his presidency and could 
be removed from office on a technicality. The President and his defenders, of course, 
were in no position to advance a rich constitutional defense of the presidency, but they 
seemed content to exploit Republican weaknesses. With its foreordained outcome and 
sordid subject matter, the impeachment was a constitutional crisis only in its banality."); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Bush v. Gore: Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.737, 758 (2001) 
("The Court's decision in Bush v Gore [produced] a prompt and decisive conclusion to the 
chaotic post-election period of 2000. Indeed, it probably did so in a way that carried more 
simplicity and authority than anything that might have been expected from the United 
States Congress. The Court might even have avoided a genuine constitutional crisis."); 
Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election 
Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1,. 46 ("Consideration of the 
practicalities of continued recounting is notable by its absence from the opinions of the 
dissenting Justices in Bush v Gore. They were content to leave the matter to be resolved 
by Congress in January-or later, for that matter. I cannot see the case for precipitating 
a political and constitutional crisis merely in order to fuss with a statistical tie that, 
given the inherent subjectivity involved in hand counting spoiled ballots, can never be 
untied. Had the responsibility for determining who would be President fallen to 
Congress in January, there would have been a competition in indignation between the 
parties' supporters, with each side accusing the other of having stolen the election. 
Whatever Congress did would have been regarded as the product of raw politics, with no 
tincture of justice. The new President would have been deprived of a transition period in 
which to organize his administration and would have taken office against a background 
of unprecedented bitterness. His "victory" would have been an empty one; he could not 
have governed effectively."); Feature, War Powers Revisited, 37 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 171, 
180 (2001) "[The] lengthy and persistent struggle between the branches over the 
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution has proven impervious to political 
resolution, in somewhat the same manner as the constitutional controversies over the 
President's power to remove Executive officials and the legislative veto could not be 
resolved politically. Judicial resolution of the issue is the only method to resolve this 
intractable dispute between the political branches over their respective constitutional 
authorities before it erupts again in the context of another constitutional crisis of the 
order presented by the Vietnam War. Judicial resolution could prevent the inevitable 
repetition of the traumatic constitutional experience the country and the government 
experienced during that war - an experience from which the Congress sought to protect 
the Nation by enacting the War Powers Resolution. The cost of judicial abstention now is 
likely to be paid by future generations."); Memorandum, Indochina: The Constitutional 
Crisis, reprinted in 116 CONG. REC. 15,409, 15,411 (1970) (authored by Yale Law 
Professors Alexander Bickel and Elias Clark, 12 Yale law students, and a number of 
prominent lawyers); William D. Rogers, The United States Constitution In Its Third 
Century: Foreign Affairs: Epilogue: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs: Two Hundred 
Years, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 894, 895 (1989) ("The Iran-contra affair then can be seen as the 
capstone incident of an extended period of constitutional competition between the 
branches over foreign policy. Persuaded that Congress was wrong, a band of zealots 
seized a piece of the international relations power of the executive branch, cutting 
squarely across the expressed legislative policy of the Boland amendment. In the effort, 
they lied to Congress (and may have misled even the President himself ... It is therefore 
something of a paradox that, within 2 years of Iran-contra, there should be so general a 
sense that the nation is moving away from the concerns that inspired the constitutional 
crisis and toward a new bipartisanship in foreign affairs."); Dr. Anthony Simones, The 
Iran-Contra Affair: Ten Years Later, 67 UMKC L. REV. 61, 75 (1998) ("The Iran-Contra 
Affair did not occur merely because the Reagan Administration thought it could pursue 
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There are, however, two major problems with such 
characterizations. The first is that none of these events 
constitutes a genuine crisis. The second is, in spite of all of the 
interest constitutional scholars have had in crises, most do not 
define what they mean by a constitutional crisis. Indeed, there 
is no consensus on any standards for determining what 
constitutes a crisis in constitutionallaw.2 In short, we lack any 
its initiatives secretly. It occurred because our system allowed the Reagan 
Administration to believe it could pursue its initiatives secretly, while it encouraged 
Congress to insist on access and accountability ... Ours is a system which allows the 
President to engage in covert operations which require secrecy for their success, yet 
which gives Congress access to information about those operations, and which ultimately 
provides the President with a weapon that he may use to keep this information from 
Congress. When both Congress and the Reagan Administrations sought to avail 
themselves of the opportunities presented by our constitutional system, the struggle 
between secrecy and accountability produced a constitutional crisis."); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Reagan Ignites a Constitutional Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1987, at A31 ("When 
Ronald Reagan was elected on an antigovernment platform, pundits smiled. When 
incumbent President Reagan was re-elected on such a platform, political scientists were 
puzzled. But when the President's status as a perpetually bemused and patriotic 
outsider is transformed from a political stance into a shield against the rule of law, a 
constitutional crisis is at hand."). 
2. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, "To Do A Great Right, Do A Little Wrong"; A User's 
Guide to Judicial Lawlessness," 86 MINN. L. REV. 227, 245-46 (2001) (footnote omitted) 
("The usual definition of a constitutional crisis is a dispute between coequal branches of 
government about the Constitution's meaning that calls into question the authority of 
either one to trump the other."); Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The 
Independence of the Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 88 
(1998) ("[W]hen Congress and the President have tested the constitutional limits of their 
power over the courts ... the result has typically been a constitutional crisis. Some 
obvious examples include the 1801 Act and its repeal, the 1805 impeachment 
proceedings against Justice Samuel Chase, the 1937 court-packing plan of Franklin 
Roosevelt and the 1989 nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. Constitutional 
crises are occasionally unavoidable and instructive, but they are hardly to be encouraged 
or held aloft as defining features of a constitutional democracy in good repair."); Robert 
G. Kaiser, No "Crisis" Yet From Electoral Uncertainty, Say Legal Scholars, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 11, 2000, at A10 (quoting John Yoo as saying a "constitutional crisis is if people 
ignore or attack the Constitution"; Christopher Schroeder as suggesting a constitutional 
crisis arises when "one of the branches of the government decides not to acknowledge 
and accede to . . . the legitimate authority of another branch of government"; and 
Michael Gerhardt as defining "a constitutional crisis as a confrontation of great national 
importance "in which the Constitution does not provide a clear answer ... "); Miles 
Benson & J. Scott Orr, Staying Alive; Stage May Be Set For a Constitutional Crisis, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 10, 2000, at G1 ("Dean L. Kinvin Wroth of Vermont Law School 
defines a constitutional crisis as 'the point at which one branch or level of government 
declines to obey the mandate of another."); Dana Milbank, Worst-Case Scenario: The 
U.S. Has None; Constitutional Crisis, Chaos Forseen if Top Leaders Killed, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 10, 2001, at A1 (quoting Washington State Rep. Brian Baird as stating "If somebody 
hits us in a severe and coordinated attack, there will be great confusion and possibly a 
constitutional crisis."); H. John Rogers, Presidency on a Platter; High Court Supremely 
Bold in Election Ruling, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Feb. 2, 2001, at 5A ("The 
system works tolerably well as long as the judiciary only snips at the heels of the 
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constitutional values are implemented. 
If one were genuinely interested in determining how written 
constitutionalism gets implemented (and that is the process by 
which the Constitution's binding authority operates), courts are 
not the best place to look. It might be useful to examine those 
instances in which adherence to the written Constitution is 
getting stretched to, if not beyond, the limit. If, as is commonly 
suggested, a constitution's mandates are "proscribed by Philip 
sober to control Philip drunk, "6 there is likelier to be no instance 
in which Philip is more drunk or less disposed to act responsibly 
than a genuine crisis in which authorities are severely tempted 
to take their powers beyond the written limits set forth in the 
Constitution. 
So, my first objective is to explain the criteria for 
determining a crisis in constitutional law. I use these criteria to 
clarify the relationship among the three different kinds of crises 
in constitutional law - judicial, political, and constitutional. 
Once I have clarified the different elements of each of these, I 
will demonstrate how this understanding · illuminates the 
significance of the recent controversies to which I have referred 
above, and how the binding authority of our Constitution is 
achieved through its implementation. Perhaps most 
importantly, I suggest constitutional crises are extremely rare 
episodes in which national political leaders recognize the 
inadequacy of the Constitution. Their recognition that the 
Constitution cannot answer the critical problem at hand is an 
acknowledgment of the limits of the written Constitution. In 
every other circumstance that falls short of a genuine 
constitutional crisis, the pull of the Constitution as a framework 
not only for discussion but also for resolution of conflict is 
evident. Consequently, constitutional crises are distinctive as 
the only instances in which the limits of written 
constitutionalism are not just reached but also breached. 
II. UNDERSTANDING CRISES 
There are at least three kinds of crises in constitutional law. 
The first is a judicial crisis. It is tempting to define a judicial 
crisis as arising when political authorities object to the Court's 
6. DAVID BREWER, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY AS THE SALVATION OF THE 
NATION, IN NEW YORK BAR AsSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK BAR 
AsSOCATION 37, 37-47 (1893), reprinted in 11 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA: AGRARIANISM 
AND URBANIZATION 1884-1894, at 423, 428 (1968). 
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framework for judging whether something is a constitutional 
crisis or not. 
My purpose today is to fill this void. My intention is to 
develop a framework for analyzing crises in constitutional law, 
and to assess the implications of this framework for 
understanding constitutional law. In fact, understanding why 
none of the many incidents characterized recently as crises 
actually were genuine crises helps to answer one of the biggest, 
if not the biggest, question in all of constitutional law: how our 
written Constitution continues to bind the nation long after the 
deaths of those who drafted and ratified it.3 Understanding the 
elements of a crisis helps to illuminate our continued national 
commitment to written constitutionalism. 
We are only just now beginning to understand the ways in 
which our Constitution binds the nation. The trick to 
understanding how the Constitution retains its binding 
authority over time requires us to explore how our Constitution 
is implemented, i.e., how its various guarantees, values, and 
provisions are translated into action.4 
For many if not most constitutional theorists, the central 
institution responsible for implementation of the Constitution is 
the federal judiciary.5 I think legal scholars give courts far too 
much credit for maintaining constitutionalism. In fact, courts 
are marginally involved in the implementation of the 
Constitution. They deal only with a relatively small number of 
constitutional issues. Courts are not the principal fora in which 
constitutional issues arise or get addressed. In practice, the vast 
majority of constitutional issues are dealt with outside of the 
courts. It is outside of the courts, in Congress, the White House, 
federal agencies, and even state governorships and legislatures, 
that constitutional issues are routinely addressed and most 
executive and legislative branches of government, but where judges seek to supplant la 
volente general with their own socioeconomic thinking (as happened during Roosevelt's 
first term) we are brushing up against a real, rather than euphemistic constitutional 
crisis."). 
3. See generally JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001). 
4. Michael J. Gerhardt, The End of Theory, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 283 (2001) 
(reviewing JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND THEORY: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
SELF-GoVERNMENT (2001)). See also CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITIONAL SELF-
GoVERNMENT (2001); RICHARD H. FALLOW, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSITUTION (2001). 
5. Though he arrives at it by a different route, Jed Rubenfeld ends up offering a 
relatively typical account of the federal judiciary as the primary institution responsible 
for maintaining national commitment to the Constitution over time. RUBENFELD, supra 
note 3. 
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having struck down or overridden something they have done. If 
this were our working definition, I suggest that there would be a 
problem, because the definition I have just given you is none 
other than the classical understanding of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty as described by the late Alexander 
Bickel, 7 and there would be a crisis each and every time the 
Court exercised judicial review to strike down some democratic 
enactment or decision. To say that a political objection to a 
judicial decision provokes or precipitates a judicial crisis dilutes 
the meaning of crisis, because it would mean we have been 
experiencing a crisis just about every time an exercise of judicial 
review provokes some angry or negative reaction from some 
political authorities. It is likely, at least in theory, that a 
judicial decision overturning some popular enactment (or action 
by a democratically elected official) will anger some 
constituency. Some scholars have recently suggested, however, 
the extent of such conflicts are greatly exaggerated;8 they have 
argued that only rarely has there been a decision of the Supreme 
Court that did not enjoy the support of the majority of 
Americans at the time it was decided or soon thereafter.9 
A more plausible definition of judicial crisis arises not when 
there is a conflict between the Court and political authorities, 10 
but rather when political authorities persistently to refuse to 
follow and to retaliate against the Court's answer to a question 
of constitutional meaning. Under this definition there have 
been remarkably few genuine judicial crises. Many episodes 
commonly thought to constitute crises fall short. For instance, 
the first time the Court exercised judicial review to strike down 
a state law - Chisholm v. Georgia11 - was so unpopular that it 
took literally a matter of days for the decision to be overturned 
by a constitutional amendment.12 While the Chisholm decision 
7. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2nd ed.1986). 
8. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 
(1993). 
9. See Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore: Through the Lens of Constitutional 
History, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1721 (2001). 
10. Note that the Court has struck down 28 federal laws in the past six years, but 
no scholar has yet designated these decisions as constituting a crisis in constitutional 
law. A few scholars have, however, suggested this trend constitutes a revolution in 
constitutional law. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the 
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). 
11. 2 u.s. 419 (1793). 
12. See Klarman, supra note 9. 
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provoked some controversy, the controversy subsided almost as 
quickly as it arose. 
A better candidate for a genuine judicial crisis is the 
political fallout from and retaliation against the Court's efforts 
to enforce its decision in Brown v. Board of Education 1.13 The 
Southern Manifesto and other acts of defiance and protest 
followed almost immediately after the decision came down. 14 
The defiance persisted throughout most of the 1960s, until the 
President and Congress decisively sided with the Court through 
the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other progressive 
civil rights measures. Once all three institutions of the national 
government fell into line behind desegregation, the resistance 
began to break down. 15 By then, Brown had gone for more than 
a decade without full implementation in the deep South. 
Another popular candidate for a judicial crisis is the conflict 
generated by the Supreme Court's propensity to protect 
economic liberties and property rights in the first few decades of 
the 20th century. This period covers both the Lochner era16 and 
the New Deal eraP In the Lochner era, or the period from 1893 
to 1924, Congress considered 20 proposals to curb the federal 
courts' jurisdiction in retaliation against the Court's perceived 
activism.18 In the remarkably brief period from 1935 to 1937, 
Congress considered 37 bills proposing to curb the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts.19 During his first term, President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and other Democrats publicly criticized the Court's 
rulings striking down several New Deal measures.20 By 1936, as 
Michael Klarman suggests, ''both Democrats and Republicans 
endorsed state minimum wage legislation, and thus [the Court's 
decision in Morehead v. New York ex rei. Tipaldo21] incited a 
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
14. See generally LUCAS POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 
(2000). See also Gerhardt, supra note 4. 
15. See Klarman, supra note 9. 
16. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001). 
17. Klarman, supra note 9 at 1751 (referring to "the New Deal constitutional 
crisis" but not explaining why). See also William Carlsen, Roosevelt's End Run Around 
the Courts; Secret Trials Provoked Constitutional Crisis, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Nov. 30, 
2001, at A18 (stating that, "The tense legal drama unfolding in Washington in the 
summer of 1942 had all the trappings of a constitutional crisis."). 
18. Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, in THE IMPACT OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 35, 35-4 7 (Theodore L. Becker ed., 1969). 
19. Id. at 36-37. 
20. Klarman, supra note 9, at 1751. 
21. 97 U.S. 702 (1936). 
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firestorm of criticism."22 That decision was the proximate cause 
of Roosevelt's infamous Court-packing plan, which was the most 
notorious of the many assaults undertaken at the time against 
the Court.23 Though the proposal failed, constitutional scholars 
to this day still debate the significance of this failure and its 
·connection to the Court's purported "switch in time."24 
Yet another possible judicial crisis has been engendered by 
Roe v. Wade. 25 The nation remains divided in its agreement 
with the fundamental rule announced in the case, and several 
presidents- Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George W. 
Bush - openly campaigned against the decision and purposely 
nominated as judges people who were opposed to the decision.26 
To this day, Republican and Democratic presidents make choices 
of judicial nominees based to a significant degree on their 
attitudes about the legitimacy of Roe. The persistence of the 
relevance of Roe to judicial selection indicates the extent to 
which the political discord engendered by the decision still 
rages. 
If a judicial crisis is predicated on persistent political 
resistance to a judicial decision, what is a political crisis, and 
how does it differ from a judicial crisis? I suggest a political 
crisis arises when political authorities are fighting amongst 
themselves for supremacy over a particular domain of 
policymaking. 
Prime examples of political crises (of varying intensity) are 
the set of presidential impeachments, beginning with Andrew 
Johnson and including Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton.27 In the 
first of these instances, Congress and the President were plainly 
in a contest for supremacy in dictating Reconstruction policy. 
Interestingly, Johnson was not the first president to have been 
threatened with impeachment because of his overzealous use of 
the veto (and efforts to assert his will over domestic 
policymaking),28 but he was the first to be impeached and thus 
22. Klarman, supra note 9, at 1751. 
23. WILLIAM EDWARD LEUCHTENBURG, IN THE SHADOW OF FDR: FROM HARRY 
TRUMAN TO GEORGE W. BUSH (3rd ed., rev. & updated 2001). 
24. See EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000). 
25. 410 U.S. 959 (1973). 
26. See generally, DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, A PuRsUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL 
POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999). 
27. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000 ). 
28. Earlier threats of impeachment had been directed against President John 
Tyler and President Andrew Jackson. 
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to face removal for his understanding and deployment of the 
prerogatives of his office. As one can see, the magnitude of the 
crisis seems to have diminished with each of the episodes, so the 
greatest controversy arises with Johnson because of the great 
stakes involving the balance of power, followed by the serious 
conflict between Nixon and Congress culminating in his 
resignation, and the more tepid conflict - tepid, i.e., by relative 
comparison- of the Clinton impeachment ordeal. 
At what point does a judicial or political crisis transform 
into a constitutional crisis? My answer is only rarely. I 
understand a constitutional crisis to arise when conflicting 
authorities recognize the limits of the Constitution, i.e., when 
contending authorities find or acknowledge that the 
Constitution· provides no answer to the controversy at hand. A 
constitutional crisis is not necessarily the result of the joining of 
judicial and political crises. A constitutional crisis is not just a 
serious conflict among the leaders of national political 
institutions, or between the courts and the political branches, 
but rather a special circumstance in which political leaders 
recognize that the Constitution provides no guidance and no 
adequate process for resolving the political crisis at hand. 
Where have we seen such crises? I suggest two examples 
here. The first is that slavery precipitated a political crisis that 
ultimately transformed into a constitutional crisis when the 
Southern states seceded from the Union. Secession presented 
the President and the Congress with a problem for which the 
Constitution had no answer.29 It came about in part because of 
the President's and Congress' refusal to back down in trying to 
contain or get rid of slavery in spite of Dred Scott u. Sandford. 30 
Hence, Dred Scott precipitated a judicial crisis that helped to 
transform an ongoing political crisis over slavery into the 
constitutional crisis of secession. I do not think Dred Scott, 
standing alone, constituted a constitutional crisis, because 
political authorities who disagreed with it were not unfamiliar 
with how to deal with constitutional decisions with which they 
disagreed. Lincoln, for instance, simply refused to acknowledge 
the decision as legitimate and thus to enforce it.31 In doing so, 
he took a path previously trod by his predecessors in office who 
29. Compare 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) and 
MARK V. TuSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1988). 
30. 60 u.s. 393 (1856). 
31. See generally id. 
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had fought to protect a president's right to disagree with the 
Supreme Court and avoid compliance with it, if at all possible.32 
There were, however, no adequate constitutional mechanisms 
available to solve secession. 
Another example of a constitutional crisis occurred in 1800 
when Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr received the same 
number of votes in the Electoral College.33 While they (and their 
supporters) knew which had run as president and vice-
president, and thus which should have been considered the 
victor in the presidential election, Burr's refusal to acknowledge 
the obvious forced the House of Representatives to resolve which 
of the two men was president. In making this decision, the 
House received no guidance from the Constitution or historical 
practices. While the House voted ultimately to designate 
Jefferson as President (after several attempts), the confusion, 
discord, and uncertainty generated by the tie vote in the 
Electoral College between the top two Republicans running in 
the election precipitated a movement to amend the Constitution, 
culminating in the Twelfth Amendment.34 
Ill. THE BIG PICTURE 
The framework I have proposed for clarifying different 
kinds of crises in our constitutional system is incomplete. At the 
very least, further clarification of the relationship among these 
different kinds of crises - and the implications of these 
relationships for written constitutionalism - are necessary. 
First, judges lack the means to solve genuine political crises, 
and national political leaders can be instrumental in helping to 
resolve judicial crises. On the few occasions when courts have 
triggered crises, judges have had to rely on the political process 
ultimately to resolve them. I can think of no judicial crisis that 
courts have settled on their own. Even when courts have been 
called upon to resolve political crises, they have failed to do so. 
Dred Scott is the most spectacular example of such a failure; it 
exacerbated rather than helped to resolve the crisis over the 
future of slavery in the United States.35 Again, Dred Scott 
32. One obvious model for Lincoln was Andrew Jackson's veto of the Second 
National Bank. 
33. See TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH 
AMENDMENT (1994). 
34. David P. Currie, Post-Originalism, The Constitution in Congress: The 
Jeffersonians, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2001). 
35. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN 
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helped to push the political crisis over slavery into a 
constitutional crisis. 
Nor can I think of a political crisis that courts have 
resolved. When political crises have been resolved short of a 
constitutional crisis, it has not been by courts but rather by 
political leaders operating within the Constitution's intricate 
system of checks and balances. Political crises are resolved 
through accommodations however difficultly achieved through 
existing constitutional mechanisms. In other words, political 
crises can be resolved by political leaders who struggle amongst 
themselves until a political rather than a judicial solution is 
achieved. The political ill-will generated by the Alien and 
Sedition Acts ended not because of anything courts did, but 
rather because of the actions of national political leaders.36 
President Lincoln's unilateral suspension of habeas corpus was 
undoubtedly a dubious act, which Chief Justice Taney 
condemned as lawless;37 however, its ratification by Congress 
very shortly thereafter clarified its legal basis even if the 
ratification did not fully resolve the political fallout.38 Andrew 
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (2001). 
36. See JOHN CHESTER MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION 
ACTS (1951). 
37. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861). 
38. The fact that Congress ratified Lincoln's action was not of course the end of the 
matter. Indeed, the fact that Congress and the President ultimately joined together to 
support suspension of habeas corpus illustrates another kind of political crisis that has 
the distinct potential to transform into a constitutional crisis. This situation arises when 
national authorities join together to retaliate against some relatively defenseless 
segment of the population. This situation entails, in other words, a conflict between 
national authorities on the side and a relatively powerless constituency or group on the 
other. A prime example of such a conflict is the internment of Japanese-Americans in 
World War II. Federal military and political leaders put together the internment plan 
with little or no evidence in support, but the Supreme Court ratified it in a closely 
divided opinion. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). With political 
and judicial authorities unified against them, the incarcerated Japanese-Americans had 
no recourse left - the Constitution was literally of no avail to them until well after the 
War. A 1980 Act of Congress established a Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Internment of Civilians to study the Japanese relocation during World War II. The 
Commission concluded, "The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 [which the Court 
had upheld in Korematsu] was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions 
which followed from it [were] not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad 
historical causes which shaped [the exclusion decisions] were race prejudice, war 
hysteria, and the failure of political leadership. [A] grave injustice was done." Report of 
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice 
Denied 18 (1982). In 1984, a federal district court relied on the Commission's findings in 
granting a writ of coram nobis and vacating the conviction of Fred Korematsu, the 
original defendant in Korematsu. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406 
(N.D.Cal. 1984). In 1988, President Reagan signed legislation formally acknowledging 
injustices imposed by the internment and providing for the payment of reparations. 
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Johnson and Bill Clinton did not challenge their impeachments 
in court but rather relied upon the constitutional process to 
absolve them. 
Courts also played no significant role in resolving the 
political and constitutional questions triggered by the Korean, 
Vietnam, and Persian Gulf Wars.39 Courts also will likely not 
have a significant role in settling some fundamental questions 
arising in the recent against terrorism, such as the legitimacy of 
President Bush's executive order authorizing military tribunals 
for some non-citizens charged with terrorist activities against 
the United States. It is too soon otherwise to predict the 
outcomes or the significance of the cases challenging some 
aspects of the conditions, such as the secrecy, under which some 
people are being detained by the federal government in the war 
on terrorism. 
While the Watergate tapes case clearly weakened the 
political opposition to Nixon's impeachment,40 it would be wrong 
to think that it resolved the political conflict between Nixon and 
the Congress. As Gerald Gunther suggests, democratic 
institutions were proceeding methodically to deal with Nixon's 
misconduct separate from and without judicial intervention.41 
These institutions were not looking to the courts for help or 
reinforcement. Moreover, Gunther suggests that this fact 
indicates there really was no genuine crisis provoked by the 
movement to impeach Nixon. Had Nixon not resigned, there is 
every indication that Nixon would not only have been impeached 
but there would also have been little doubt the Senate would 
have removed him.42 The impeachment effort against Nixon had 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 1 (1989)). It is conceivable that in the framework I have suggested that the exclusion 
and internment of Japanese-Americans constitute a constitutional crisis because clearly 
the Constitution provided no adequate mechanism to protect the Japanese-Americans on 
the West Coast from the "historical causes" cited by the Commission on Wartime 
Relocation and Internment of Civilians. More precisely, the lapses and failures that led 
to the exclusion and internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II could be 
understood as a crisis in which national political, military, and judicial authorities joined 
together to deprive them a constitutional remedy for the damage done to them. 
39. The legality of each of these "wars" was greatly debated during their respective 
durations, and continues to raise questions about where they fit within the 
constitutional framework. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 
(1993). 
40. Kutler v. United States, 423 U.S. 959 (1975). 
41. Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon 
Case and the Impeachment Process, 20 UCLA L. REV. 30 (1974). 
42. Richard Posner suggests, however, had Nixon been willing to place himself at 
the mercy of the American people immediately after the Watergate break-in he might 
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a momentum separate from the judicial process. 
The Jefferson administration's attempted employment of 
the impeachment power to create vacancies in the federal 
judiciary posed a different kind of political crisis.43 It did not 
just begin, simply enough, from one judicial decision (or one 
judge's actions), but rather the crass desire to use impeachment 
to get rid of "unfit" judges apparently defined in such a manner 
as only to apply to Federalist judges. This deployment of 
impeachment came to a head when the House impeached but 
the Senate failed to convict Associate Samuel Chase for various 
judicial acts, including providing assistance to prosecutions of 
Republicans under the Alien and Sedition Acts passed with the 
backing and approval of the Adams administration.44 Chase's 
impeachment was a political crisis because it threatened to 
transform the impeachment power into a mechanism to unseat a 
justice for his conduct on the bench. In other words, Chase's 
impeachment was a political crisis in which the independence of 
the judiciary hung in the balance.45 
It is tempting to perceive the New Deal crisis as not fitting 
within the pattern of political crises I have sketched.46 It is 
possible that, by taking a more deferential stance toward 
economic regulations, the Court helped to defuse the brewing 
controversy or cns1s between it and national political 
authorities. There are, however, two reasons this perspective is 
wrong. On the one hand, there is every reason to think that the 
political institutions could or would have dealt with the Court's 
opposition to the New Deal. In time, President Roosevelt's 
appointees would surely have dominated the Court, at which 
point the Court would have shifted its positions on economic due 
process and Congress' Commerce Clause powers. On the other 
hand, there is still reason to think that the Court did back down 
under enormous political pressure not just from the Court-
have deflected the impeachment action initiated against him. Richard A. Posner, 
Dworkin, Polemics and the Clinton Impeachment Controuersey, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1023 
(2000). 
43. See N. E. H. Hull & Peter Charles Hoffer, Historians and the Impreachment 
Imbroglio: In Search of a Seruicable History, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 473 (2000). 
44. See William H. Rehnquist, The American Constitutional Experience: Remarks 
ofthe Chief Justice, 54 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1166-67 (1994). 
45. See Stephen B. Presser, Et Tu Raoul? Or the Original Misunderstanding 
Misunderstood, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1475 (1991); Stephen B. Presser, The Original 
Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 106 (1989). 
46. Klarman, supra note 9, at 1751. 
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packing plan but perhaps more importantly from Roosevelt's 
overwhelming re-election in 1936 and the mid-term elections of 
1938. It is credible to think one of the pivotal justices, Owen 
Roberts, was ultimately convinced to shift his own position on 
the propriety of economic regulation because of the signals sent 
by the election of 1936, in which the American people 
overwhelmingly re-elected Franklin D. Roosevelt based in part 
on his campaign against the Court.47 
A second important clarification involves the causes for 
crises. The apparent triggers of a judicial crisis include, among 
others, a sharp ideological divide between the leaders of political 
and judicial institutions, a very serious social or economic 
conflict, and significant public and special interest opposition.48 
Interestingly, there is a clear pattern to the persistent 
retaliations undertaken by Congress against the courts: 
Democrats (as the party purporting to represent populists and 
minorities) have tended to mobilize against the decisions 
protecting economic liberties and property rights, while 
Republicans (as the party purporting to defend majority and 
business interests) have tended to mobilize against decisions 
that favor minorities or reduced majoritarian power.49 
Protracted or intense federalism and separation-of-powers 
conflicts turn to a significant degree on partisanship and 
conflicting desires to control the means to resolve some socially 
or politically significant conflict (involving, for instance, the 
national economy, civil rights, or national security). 
Third, the framework I have sketched for understanding 
crises in constitutional law illuminates how the Constitution 
binds through its implementation. Many events have not risen 
to the level of a constitutional crisis because the contending 
parties have framed their arguments in constitutional terms and 
accepted that the Constitution provided a process for resolving 
their dispute. The electoral dispute of 2000 fits this picture 
perfectly, in spite of the outcries that it either came close to 
being a crisis or actually was a crisis.5o It was not a judicial 
crisis, because (1) national political authorities did not resist or 
47. Compare Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 
228-39 (1994), and Laura Kalman, Law, Politics and the New Deal, 108 YALE L.J. 2165 
(1999). 
48. See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Three: the Lesson of Lachner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001). 
49. See Nagel, supra note 18. 
50. Klarman, supra note 9, at 1725-26. 
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retaliate against the decision and (2) state political authorities 
never had the opportunity to retaliate against the state court 
decisions. It was never a political crisis at least at the national 
level. This was unlike any of the previous electoral disputes of 
1800, 1824, and 1876, all of which ended up in the House, one of 
which required a constitutional amendment, 51 and another of 
which produced the federal statutory mechanisms on which both 
Bush's and Gore's lawyers relied upon, and referred to 
repeatedly throughout the conflict.52 In this dispute, national 
political leaders never had the chance to formally contest the 
outcome and thus it hardly qualifies as a political crisis. Since 
the dispute was not a political crisis, it never had the chance of 
becoming a constitutional crisis. No major political leader ever 
challenged either the federal courts' authority to resolve the 
conflict or claimed the Constitution provided no process for 
resolving the dispute. To the contrary, the major parties each 
claimed the law and the Constitution were on their side.53 When 
the Court finally settled the dispute, no national political 
leaders suggested resisting it. 
If the electoral dispute of 2000 was a crisis at all, it was 
almost entirely internal to our court system. At its most 
intense, it was a contest among federal and state judicial 
authorities, but there was never a question of which of these 
authorities reigned supreme. 54 Once the Supreme Court decided 
Bush u. Gore,55 the debate was not about whether the Supreme 
Court could overturn a state court judgment (settled since 
Martin u. Hunter's Lessee56), but rather whether the Court 
exercised its lawful authority properly in the facts of this case. 
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
52. See Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons from the 2000 Presidential 
Election, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 974 (2001). 
53. Indeed, the parties were determined to cast their arguments in the manner 
least offensive to the Constitution. At every step, Bush's and Gore's respective advocates 
maintained in state and federal courts that the Constitution and relevant statutory 
provisions favored their positions. Before the Supreme Court, the prevailing side 
argued, for instance, that the Court's precedents on voting rights as well as the 
applicable federal statute supported both the Court's jurisdiction and the overruling of 
the state supreme court's decision favoring Gore. No matter what one thinks of Bush v. 
Gore, the parties claimed constitutional legitimacy, including precedents, for everything 
they argued and did. Even if you disagree with some of those precedents (as I am sure 
some of the justices and even some of Bush's lawyers did), their disagreement did not 
preclude them from relying on those precedents as a legitimate basis for the ultimate 
decision. 
54. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
55. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
56. 14 u.s. 304. 
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Even at the time the decision came down, roughly half of the 
country and almost all political authorities largely fell behind 
it.57 Subsequent developments, particularly the war against 
terrorism, increase the odds against political retaliation against 
the Court for its decision. 
In the wide range of conflicts that fall short of a 
constitutional crisis, the structure of the Constitution operates 
as an imposing force. For instance, the supermajority vote 
requirement for removal of impeached officials imposes such a 
high hurdle on removal that it cannot be too surprising to find 
that only about half of the officials impeached in our history 
have also been removed.58 In other words, the supermajority 
vote requirement helps to stack the deck against removal. Thus, 
there was never a serious question about whether the Senate 
would ever remove Clinton from office for his misconduct related 
to Monica Lewinsky. 
The structure also provides the means by which the political 
branches can correct (or at least try to correct what they regard 
as) judicial errors. The Constitution provides a wide variety of 
mechanisms that they have used to redress or retaliate against 
the Court's mistakes. We saw how quickly political leaders 
reacted to correct what they perceived as the error of Chisholm 
v. Georgia.59 In the aftermath of Roe we have seen presidents 
deride the decision, call for its overruling, support legislation 
designed to weaken it, and seek to appoint justices who would 
overturn (or at least severely limit) it; members of Congress, 
particularly senators, question its legitimacy and propose both 
amendments and different kinds of jurisdictional limits to 
overturn or limit the damage of the decision; and at least four 
justices prepared to overrule Roe.6° In other words, the critical 
response to Roe has fastidiously tracked constitutional 
procedures. 
The structure's impact is evident from a survey of the 
political crises generated by the electoral disputes of 1800, 1824, 
and 1876. In 1800, national leaders were vexed at the omissions 
of the original Constitution, and their solution was to change the 
Constitution.61 In 1824, the failure of any of the major 
57. See Klarman, supra note 9, at 1748; Friedman, supra note 48, at 1448. 
58. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Special Constitutional Structure of the Federal 
Impeachment Process, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 245 (2000). 
59. 2 u.s. 419 (1793). 
60. See Klarman, supra note 9. 
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
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presidential candidates to get a majority of electoral votes led to 
a proceeding in the House in which, Andrew Jackson claimed, 
John Quincy Adams entered into a "corrupt bargain" with Henry 
Clay to steal the election.62 Jackson took his case to the 
American people, who heard his message and overwhelmingly 
elected him to the presidency in 1828. In that circumstance, 
there was no need to change the Constitution, because it 
provided the political means by which Jackson could seek 
redress. In 1876, there were serious questions about the 
outcomes of close votes in some states (including Florida) forcing 
the House back into the position to resolve the disputes. Relying 
on the constitutional language empowering each chamber of 
Congress to adopt appropriate procedures to implement their 
respective authorities, the House appointed a special 
commission, which rendered a rather dubious opinion about how 
disputed electoral votes should be counted. Samuel Tildren 
graciously accepted the commission's vote, while Rutherford B. 
Hayes agreed to serve only one term as a means to quiet 
discontent over the decision. Hayes agreed further to cut a deal 
with Southern Democrats to end Reconstruction in exchange for 
their not challenging further the commission decision. There 
was nothing extra-constitutional about these measures. 
To the contrary, these informal agreements were arranged 
within the checks and balances set forth in the Constitution. A 
genuine constitutional crisis was ultimately averted because the 
checks and balances of the Constitution proved adequate to force 
the disputants into a peaceful resolution of their conflict. In 
other words, political crises present prime opportunities to 
measure the extent to which the Constitution's checks and 
balances can force parties into accommodations. When the 
parties to a dispute make recourse to existing constitutional 
mechanisms to resolve their differences, there is plainly no 
constitutional crisis. 63 When the parties are unable to work out 
their differences through existing checks and balances, a 
constitutional crisis is likely to ensue. 
62. See generally 2 ROBERT VINCENT REMINI, THE COARSE OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, 
1822-1832 (1998); HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF 
JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1990); PAUL C. NAGEL, JOHN QUINCEY ADAMS: A PuBLIC LIFE, A 
PRIVATE LIFE (1999). 
63. For example, the Bush administration claims no novel authority for what its 
most aggressive actions in combating terrorism have been. It relies on Supreme Court 
precedent and prior presidents' executive orders to support its authority. In attempting 
to reconcile its actions with the Constitution, they implicitly ratify the existing 
constitutional order. 
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The dynamic in a genuine constitutional crisis is, however, 
radically different from those of judicial and political crises. It is 
here that the limits of written constitutionalism have been not 
only reached but also exceeded. This is the rare circumstance in 
which the contending parties recognize that the Constitution 
provides no answer to their dispute or even the means, as it 
exists at the time of their dispute, by which to resolve it. 
Consider, again, the example of secession. The contending 
sides clearly had their respective arguments, many of which 
were claimed to have been grounded in the Constitution or some 
authoritative source of constitutional meaning. The difficulty 
was that the sides could not agree on how, or even whether, the 
Constitution provided the means by which to resolve their 
different views on the constitutionality or legitimacy of 
secession. Secession was the culmination of the failure of either 
political or judicial authorities to settle the legitimacy and 
future of slavery on then existing constitutional terms. There 
simply was no common or middle ground left for the major 
disputants to settle their fundamentally different visions of the 
Constitution, including the nation's and states' respective 
authorities under it. The middle ground of course would have to 
have been something grounded in or consistent with the 
Constitution, but none was ever found.64 Hence, it is only in the 
rare circumstance of a constitutional crisis, as I have defined it, 
that the Constitution is of no avail. And that is precisely the 
point, for the crisis is the anxiety and conflict generated by the 
recognition that the Constitution cannot, and does not, solve the 
crisis facing the country. 
A final clarification involves the relationship between the 
framework I have suggest for analyzing crises in constitutional 
64. One could argue, I suppose, that the efforts of national political leaders from 
the 1840s until Lincoln's election had been attempting in vain to find such common 
ground. The Missouri Compromise, the Great Compromise of 1850, and the Kansas-
Nebraska Acts conceivably could each be characterized as political attempts to reconcile 
the conflict over slavery and states' rights under the Constitution. It was, however, clear 
by the time Lincoln was preparing to take office that political authorities had lost hope 
in any peaceful, political solution to the problem of slavery. Less than a week before 
Lincoln took office, the House and the Senate had passed a constitutional amendment to 
prohibit an end to slavery. The amendment provided, "No amendment shall be made to 
the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or 
interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of 
persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State." J.Res. 13, 36th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 12 Stat. 251 (1861). The idea behind the amendment was that the process of 
amendment had become futile to deal with the crisis over slavery. Most leaders expected 
war to come by that point no matter what Lincoln or anyone else tried. 
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law and another possible crisis in constitutionallaw.65 In 1996, 
Professors Mark Tushnet and Louis Seidman of Georgetown 
declared that there was a crisis in constitutional theory because 
it had lost its way.66 They expressed concern that civility in 
academic discourse about the Constitution no longer seemed 
possible. They also worried that constitutional theorists had 
become too preoccupied with courts and not enough with the 
quality of the decision-making of the political branches. Not 
long thereafter, several judges and other prominent scholars 
denounced a growing divide between constitutional theory and 
practice.67 They complained that constitutional theory has 
become increasingly irrelevant to constitutional practice and 
particularly adjudication. Perhaps the most prominent critic of 
modern constitutional theory has been Richard Posner, who 
argues that constitutional scholars need to care less about 
dazzling each other and developing arcane specialities, and care 
more about mastering inter-disciplinary disciplines of much 
greater use to federal judges.68 I suspect there are even many 
65. This conception of a constitutional crisis has important implications for the 
relationship between written constitutionalism and precedent. One important function 
of precedent, as I have explained it, is to facilitate commitment to the written 
Constitution. How is this possible? The answer is evident from our exploration of the 
nature of judicial, political, and constitutional crises and what transforms a judicial or 
political crisis into a constitutional crisis. A judicial crisis might exist in circumstances 
in which either the scope of the authority of the courts is indeterminate or courts are 
challenging the authority of the political branches on grounds unacceptable to them. 
Even in the latter circumstances, precedent serves to prevent the so-called judicial crisis 
from evolving into a political crisis or, worse, constitutional crisis. Even in the case in 
which the court faces a question of first impression, there might be precedent for the 
Court's exercising judicial review over a similar or analogous conflict. In this manner, 
precedent helps to diffuse anxiety over the Court's exercise of judicial review. Even if 
the Court exceeds its authority and triggers political retaliation or dissent, there is 
precedent for that: after Dred Scott, Lincoln, for instance, refused to defer ever again to 
the Court. If matters degenerate into a political crisis, precedent, broadly understood, 
may serve the important function or purpose of providing the hook by which authorities 
retain (and exhibit) their commitment to the written Constitution. A political crisis 
might, however, transform into a constitutional crisis when there is not only an absence 
of any salient judicial precedent but recognition of the absence of no helpful or 
meaningful prior experiences, practices, or traditions. A constitutional crisis is thus that 
rare circumstance in which the nation and the parties recognize the limits of written 
constitutionalism as reflected in the failures of any of the traditional sources of 
constitutional meaning, including precedent, to solve the crisis at hand. 
66. See generally LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TuSHNET, REMNANTS OF 
BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996). 
67. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993); Richard 
A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
68. Posner, supra note 67, at 10. 
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students who wonder what the point is of seemingly unending, 
increasingly clever academic efforts to resolve the counter-
majoritarian dilemma. In addition, the fact that the academy is 
apparently dominated by political liberals interested in 
promoting judicial activism helps to exacerbate the divide 
between theory and practice, because most judges are much 
more inclined to vigorous judicial restraint.69 
This divide is further exacerbated, Posner claims, by the 
general deterioration of academics' performances as public 
intellectuals. 70 The reasons for this deterioration are manifold, 
including the lure of notoriety of commenting on high-profile 
controversies as they are unfolding.71 Several studies 
demonstrate the media's increasing penchant for soft news -
reporting primarily consisting of commentary or speculation 
about scandal - rather than hard news - strictly focusing 
reporting data rather than opinions.72 This penchant is a 
function of the growing pressure on news organizations to 
increase their audience shares by entertaining their viewers at 
least as much as informing them. The media by and large does 
not want academics because of their expertise but rather 
because of their ability to generate conflict and drama. The 
academics who can deliver become celebrities. 
I agree with Judge Posner up to the point of blaming the 
academy for lacking norms by which to hold the legal scholars 
who debate themselves (and their profession) as celebrities or 
scandal-mongers in the media,73 but the suggestion of a crisis is 
itself the problem. Contrary to Posner's assertions, the legal 
academy has plenty of mechanisms already in place to hold legal 
academics responsible as public intellectuals. The trick is to 
recognize and fortify each of these. First, the legal academy 
itself polices a good deal of academic commentary, so that 
academics who spend much time at all as public intellectuals are 
likely to receive evaluations from their colleagues as well as 
69. See generally J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 
(1998). 
70. Posner, supra note 67, at 4. 
71. Posner, supra note 67, at 2. 
72. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged and Other 
Institutional Ramifications of the Clinton Scandals, 60 MD. L. REV. 59, 96 (2001); BILL 
KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED MEDIA (1999) 
(explaining that in a "search to reclaim audience, the press has moved more toward 
sensationalism, entertainment, and opinion"); ROBERT WATERMAN MCCHESNEY, RICH 
MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES (1999). 
73. Posner, supra note 67, at 10. 
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their students. Posner's book is only one such example, as are 
the many articles Posner cites that have been written by law 
professors denouncing some of their colleagues' advocacy as 
public intellectuals. 74 Second, the media itself does more 
policing than perhaps we give it credit, particularly with respect 
to publicizing the possible conflicts-of-interest of some 
commentators. Several organizations dedicated to evaluating 
journalists' performances have recommended for some time that 
news organizations undertake more efforts to disclose their 
commentators' affiliations or biases. Third, while 
entrepreneurship is an important norm in the academy, its 
maintenance does not mean law professors cannot monitor their 
own public commentary. 
Their challenge is not, as Posner suggests, somehow to 
employ the same methodology in different fora, for this would be 
impossible given the limitations and norms of different fora. 
Instead, the challenge for legal scholars is to meet the criteria 
for excellence in each of the different fora in which they 
participate. If scholars write editorials, then it is fair to hold 
them to the standards of professional editorials. If scholars 
become pundits, then of course we should be prepared to hold 
them to the standards (if there are any) of punditry. If scholars 
choose to comment in newspapers or the media as public 
intellectuals, then we should hold them to the standard of public 
intellectuals commenting in the media. And if scholars return to 
the academy and return to plying their trade there, then we 
should hold them to the standards of excellence in the fields in 
which they claim expertise. 
If there is anything missing in these scenarios, it might be 
the failures of different fora to develop standards of 
performance. These failures are hardly irremediable. In the 
legal academy, standards are our stock and trade. Everything is 
graded, and everything is judged. So, I am not concerned and 
consider there to be no crisis if some legal scholars make 
outlandish comments outside of the academy. My primary job -
indeed, the one I am trying to perform today - is to ensure that 
they do not repeat them here. 
74. It is interesting that in determining the people who should qualify as public 
intellectuals in his study, Posner does not consider polling experts in different fields 
about which of their members they might consider as public intellectuals. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
I have intended to share with you some thoughts about the 
ways in which divisive constitutional issues get addressed, 
responsibly in my view, outside of the courts. To be sure, the 
courts, particularly with judges as skilled, disciplined, and 
honorable as Judge Browning, have served as an indispensable 
institution for implementing and clarifying the meaning of the 
Constitution in an important range of cases. But it would be 
shame, even perhaps a crisis I suggest, if we were to fail to 
recognize that the Constitution's continued viability requires the 
respect and adherence of all of those institutions and actors in 
whom it vests responsibility, including each of us. In the end, it 
is through maintaining all of the procedures authorized by the 
Constitution and respecting all of the Constitution's guarantees 
that full implementation of the Constitution takes place, and 
crises are averted. 

